RULE 62

SANPIRO FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. IAC

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision and the of respondent IAC “Laguna Transportation Co., Inc., Lauro Lopez de Leon vs. The Honorable Rafael T. Mendoza, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati, Branch CXXXV; Maximo C. Contreras and Alejandro J. Bernardo, Ex-Oficio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff, respectively; Sanpiro Finance Corporation and Delta Motor Corp.”

FACTS

From March to September, 1980, Laguna Transportation Co. Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Laguna Trans) and Lauro Lopez de Leon (hereinafter referred to as de Leon), private respondents herein, purchased from Delta Motor Corp. (Delta) 5 units of M.A.N. diesel buses covered with the usual promissory notes and deeds of chattel mortgage.

On February 27, 1981, Delta executed a Deed of Assignment

Private respondents Laguna Trans and de Leon again purchased from Delta eight units of M.A.N. diesel buses covered with the usual promissory notes and deeds of chattel mortgage.

Delta executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner Sanpiro in the amount of P26,075,246.60

Delta executed another Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner Sanpiro in the amount of P2,661,056.38 and the whereas clauses of the deed read exactly as those immediately quoted above except only as to the amount involved.

PNB sent another similarly worded letter to respondent Laguna Trans except that it was mentioned in the opening paragraph that Laguna Trans’ outstanding accounts payable to Delta stood at P3,880,237.25 as of February 29, 1984 (p. 308, Rollo).

petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with damages

On January 16, 1985, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision (Annex C, pp. 85-101, Rollo), per Justice Nestor B. Alampay (who later served with distinction in this Court), with the concurrence of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino (now a distinguished Member of this Court) and Justice Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr., the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Thereafter, petitioner filed an amended motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a resolution dated September 17, 1985 (Annex D, pp. 103-106, Rollo).

Hence, the present petition which poses the pivotal issue of whether the pendency of the Laguna case, Civil Case No. 2146, is a ground for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8636 of the Makati RTC.

The requisites for lis pendens are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity in both cases is such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

We find no difficulty in concluding that there is identity of parties between Civil Case No. B-2146 (Laguna) and in Civil Case No. 8636 ( Makati ). In the Laguna case, the plaintiffs are private respondents Laguna Trans and de Leon and one Mauro Vera Cruz and the defendants are petitioner Sanpiro, Delta, and PNB. In the Makati case, the plaintiff is petitioner Sanpiro and the defendants are private respondents Laguna Trans, de Leon, Delta, Francisco A. Magante, and John Does. In both cases, therefore, petitioner Sanpiro, private respondents Laguna Trans and de Leon, and Delta are parties, with the addition of PNB, Mauro Vera Cruz, and Francisco Magante. However, the addition or elimination of parties do not alter the situation (Del Rosario, et al. vs. Jacinto, et al., 122 Phil. 421 [1965]).

Is there identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in said cases?

Too, the identity in both cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the Laguna case would amount to res judicata in the Makati case. In the event that in the Laguna case, the judgment is that the assignment to PNB should prevail over the assignment to petitioner of the same obligations of respondent Laguna Trans, such judgment would be binding on the Makati case and would amount to res judicata of the rights and obligations of the parties therein; petitioner’s cause of action in the Makati case against Delta and private respondents would be devoid of any basis.

We find, therefore, that the Makati court acted with precipitate haste, imprudence, and lack of judicial caution, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, in ordering the seizure of the diesel buses of private respondents, fully cognizant as the presiding judge was of the pendency of Civil Case No. 2146. In this regard we quote with approval the following observations of respondent court:

As Sanpiro can make no claim that it is the owner of the vehicles in question, then until the question is resolved as to which of the assignments made by Delta Motor Corporation, that in favor of PNB or that in favor of Sanpiro Finance Corporation, should prevail, it cannot be rightly considered by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which is but another court of equal standing as the Regional Trial Court of Laguna that had earlier taken cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the same matter and controversy, that private respondent herein, Sanpiro Finance Corporation, has already established a clear right to possession as could entitle it to affect seizure of the vehicles in question. Much less has the Regional Trial Court of Makati any legal justification to dispose and decree the sale of said vehicle even before the replevin suit has proceeded to actual trial and allow retention by Sanpiro of the passenger buses of petitioner.

The fallacy of and imprudence of the action taken by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court is instantly obvious. It is plain and evident that there is an equal possibility, nay even a stronger probability, that the earlier assignment made by the Delta Motors Corporation of its credit to PNB, dated February 27, 1981 may prevail over an assignment of the same credit made three years later by Delta Motors to Sanpiro Finance Corporation pursuant to two deeds of assignment, dated January 6, 1984, (Complaint in Replevin Case No. 8636, Par. 46; Rollo, 94). To instantly favor and bestow absolute recognition to private respondent[s] Sanpiro’s alleged right of possession over the vehicles or passenger buses of the petitioner even if and after attention of respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati had been drawn to the interpleader case filed ahead and pending, is in our view, to say the very least, a manifest gross abuse of discretion and a glaring disregard of comity and respect that respondent Judge has the duty to accord to another co-equal court. (pp. 94-95, Rollo.)

the petition is hereby DENIED

AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents.

Before us is a petition to review the decision of the CA which set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 88-43887, and ordered petitioner Amado J. Lansang to pay private respondent Jose Iglesias P50,000.00 in moral damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages and P5,000.00 in attorney’s fees.

private respondents were allegedly awarded a “verbal contract of lease” in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks, including Rizal Park ,[1][1] but actually administered by high profile civic leaders and journalists. Whoever in NPDC gave such “verbal” accommodation to private respondents was unclear, for indeed no document or instrument appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents to occupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the national hero’s memory.

With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park . In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park.[2][3] In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate.[3][4]

On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner, Villanueva, and “all persons acting on their behalf”.[4][5] The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the same day.[5][6]

The TRO expired on March 28, 1988. The following day, GABI was finally evicted by NPDC.

GABI’s action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the concession. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.[6][7] Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, “the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages”[7][8] according to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable for damages under Articles 19, 21, and 24 of the Civil Code.[8][12]

Hence, this petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 88-43887, IS IN EFFECT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE WHICH CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S ACT OF TERMINATING RESPONDENT GABI’S CONCESSION IS VALID AND DONE IN THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.[9][13]

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.[10][16]

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.[11][17] Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.[12][18]

Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity.[13][19] Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park .

We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park .

The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. However, we find no evidence on record to support Iglesias’ claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABI’s ejectment from Rizal Park . Absent any satisfactory proof upon which the Court may base the amount of damages suffered, the award of moral damages cannot be sustained.[

Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only be awarded in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.[15][23] We also disallow the award for attorney’s fees, which can only be recovered per stipulation of the parties, which is absent in this case. There is no showing that any of the exceptions justifying the award of attorney’s fees absent a stipulation is present in this case.[

the instant petition is GRANTED.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
Vera

Petitioner, National Power Corporation (NPC), seeks to annul the order of respondent judge dated June 8, 1988 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which enjoined NPC from further undertaking stevedoring and arrastre services in its pier located at the Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Calaca, Batangas and directing it either to enter into a contract for stevedoring and arrastre services or to conduct a public bidding therefor. Private respondent was also allowed to continue stevedoring and arrastre services at the pier.

The instant petition arose from a complaint for prohibition and mandamus with damages filed by private respondent against NPC and Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), wherein private respondent alleged that NPC had acted in bad faith and with grave abuse of discretion in not renewing its Contract for Stevedoring Services for Coal-Handling Operations at NPC’s plant, and in taking over its stevedoring services.

Soon after the filing of private respondent’s complaint, respondent judge issued a restraining order against NPC enjoining the latter from undertaking stevedoring services at its pier. Consequently, NPC filed an “Urgent Motion” to dissolve the restraining order, asserting, inter alia: (1) that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1818, respondent judge had no jurisdiction to issue the order; and (2) that private respondent, whose contract with NPC had expired prior to the commencement of the suit, failed to establish a cause of action for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Respondent judge issued the assailed Order denying NPC’s motion and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, after finding that NPC was not empowered by its Charter, Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, to engage in stevedoring and arrastre services. Hence, the instant petition.

After a careful study of the various allegations and issues raised in the pleadings, the Court finds merit in the petition. Indeed, the assailed Order suffers from infirmities which must be rectified by the grant of a writ of certiorari in favor of the petitioner.

A. Firstly, respondent judge acted without jurisdiction when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction against NPC.

Presidential Decree No. 1818 explicitly provides:

SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

Undeniably, NPC is a public utility, created under special legislation engaged in the generation and distribution of electric power and energy. It, therefore, enjoys the protective mantle of the above decree.

Moreover, respondent judge’s finding that NPC is not empowered by its Charter to undertake stevedoring services in its pier is erroneous.

In determining whether or not an NPC act falls within the purview of the above provision, the Court must decide whether or not a logical and necessary relation exists between the act questioned and the corporate purpose expressed in the NPC charter. For if that act is one which is lawful in itself and not otherwise prohibited, and is done for the purpose of serving corporate ends, and reasonably contributes to the promotion of those ends in a substantial and not in a remote and fanciful sense, it may be fairly considered within the corporation’s charter powers [Montelibano v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, May 18, 1962, 5 SCRA 36.]

This Court is, guided by jurisprudence in the application of the above standard. In the 1963 case of Republic of the Philippines v. Acoje Mining Company, Inc. [G.R. No. L-18062, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 3611 the Court affirmed the rule that a corporation is not restricted to the exercise of powers expressly conferred upon it by its charter, but has the power to do what is reasonably necessary or proper to promote the interest or welfare of the corporation. Thus, the Court, finding that a “post office is a vital improvement in the living condition of its employees and laborers who came to settle in its mining camp which is far removed from the postal facilities or means of communication accorded to people living in a city or municipality” [Id., at P. 365], held that respondent mining corporation was empowered to operate and maintain postal facilities servicing its employees and their families at its mining camp in Sta. Cruz, Zambales despite absence of a provision in the company’s charter authorizing the former to do so.

In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that the pier located at Calaca, Batangas, which is owned by NPC, receives the various shipments of coal which is used exclusively to fuel the Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant of the NPC for the generation of electric power. The stevedoring services which involve the unloading of the coal shipments into the NPC pier for its eventual conveyance to the power plant are incidental and indispensable to the operation of the plant The Court holds that NPC is empowered under its Charter to undertake such services, it being reasonably necessary to the operation and maintenance of the power plant.

In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that private respondent’s contract for stevedoring services with NPC bad already expired. Admittedly, there is no existing contractual relationship between the parties. Moreover, private respondent’s PPA permit for cargo handling services; at the NPC Calaca pier had expired as well. On the other hand, NPC, which was under no legal obligation to renew the contract for stevedoring services with private respondent, was granted authority by the PPA to provide cargo handling services in its pier. Consequently, there was no right of private respondent that needed to be protected or preserved by a writ of preliminary injunction.

Furthermore, respondent judge’s directive ordering NPC to enter into a contract for stevedoring and arrastre services or to conduct a public bidding therefor amounted to a writ of mandamus. But it is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty; it does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion Sy Ha v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18513, April 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 797; Aprueba, et al. v. Ganzon, G.R. No. L-20867, September 3, 1966, 18 SCRA 8; Avenue Arrastre & Stevedoring Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, et al., G.R. No. L-44674, February 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 878; Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245.] As far back as 1910, in the case of Tabigue v. Duvall [16 Phil. 324], the Court laid the fundamental principle governing the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the duties to be enforced thereby must be such as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station.

Whether NPC will enter into a contract for stevedoring and arrastre services to handle its coal shipments to its pier, or undertake the services itself, is entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion. It does not involve a duty the performance of which is enjoined by law. Thus, the courts cannot direct the NPC in the exercise of this prerogative.

in view of the foregoing, the Court having considered the Petition, private respondents Comment, and the Reply thereto, Resolved to GRANT the petition. The respondent Judge’s Order dated June 8, 1988 is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on June 15, 1988 is made PERMANENT.

CASIANO A. ANGCHANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN,

Before us is a petition for mandamus seeking to: a) compel the Ombudsman to dismiss Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192; and b) direct the Ombudsman to issue a clearance in favor of petitioner Casiano A. Angchangco.

The facts are as follows:

Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City .

On August 24, 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment (Region X) rendered a decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the sum of P1,281,065.505. The decision having attained finality, a writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same. Petitioner, as the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution issued, caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI’s daily collections from its various clients.

In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. The regional trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of execution. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman, in a Memorandum dated July 31, 1992, recommended its dismissal for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, from June 25 to 28, 1990, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others things, that petitioner illegally deducted an amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed to the Court the administrative aspect of the complaints which was docketed hereat as A.M. No. 93-10-385-OMB. The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated November 25, 1993 dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of complainants to pursue their case.

Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution.

When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still remained unresolved, as a consequence of which petitioner’s request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied.

With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988). Sad to say, even this motion to dismiss, however, has not been acted upon. Hence, the instant petition.

Acting on the petition, the Court issued a resolution dated December 20, 1995 requiring respondents to comment thereon. In compliance therewith, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (in lieu of Comment), which is its way of saying it agreed with the views of petitioner. On July 22, 1996, we issued another resolution requiring the Ombudsman to file his own comment on the petition if he so desires, otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for resolution without such comment. After several extensions, respondent Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a comment dated October 7, 1996.

The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988]), wherein the Court, speaking through Justice Yap, said:

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of “speedy disposition” of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that “the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official.” In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such “painstaking and grueling scrutiny” as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge its duty mandated by the Constitution “to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof.”

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either (Rules of Court in the Philippines , Volume III by Martin, 4th Edition, page 233).

It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156 SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman’s own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition and to GRANT the same. Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192 are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of petitioner.

SO ORDERED

——————————————————————————–

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59791 February 13, 1992

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila, TEOFILO ARAYON, SR., GIL DE GUZMAN, LUCITO SANTIAGO and TERESA BAUTISTA, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari on pure question of law seeking the nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, in his capacity as the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 21, Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 20269, entitled “Manila Electric Company v. Teofilo Arayon, et al.” The aforesaid orders are as follows: (1) the order dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private respondents; (2) the order dated December 21, 1981 granting the private respondents’ omnibus motion; and (3) the order dated February 9, 1982 adjudging in favor of private respondents the fair market value of their property at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter for a total of P369,720.00 and denying the motions for contempt for being moot and academic and the motion for reconsideration of the orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Philippines . Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig , Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya , Pililla, Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig , Metro Manila.

The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner’s offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents’, the parties failed to reach an agreement.

Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated December 27, 1974 the petitioner’s legal existence and the area sought to be expropriated as too excessive.

On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a motion for contempt of court alleging, among other things that petitioner’s corporate existence had expired in 1969 and therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws.

But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order dated January 13, 1975 authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated.

On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner’s deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. However, respondents motion was denied in an order dated September 3, 1976.

In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the presiding Judge Nelly Valdellon-Solis retired, so respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed with Branch XXII.

Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing private respondents’ property.

On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.

On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended.

On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment. But despite the opposition of the petitioner, the respondent court issued the first of the questioned Orders dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private respondents, to wit:

On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from petitioner’s deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank.

By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted the Omnibus Motion

In response to private respondents’ motion for payment dated January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property.

On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt.

Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that “at this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence.”

ISSUE

whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.

On March 26, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for preliminary injunction with this Court seeking to enjoin respondent judge and all persons acting under him from enforcing the Order dated March 22, 1982.

This Court issued a temporary restraining order addressed to respondent judge. A motion to lift the restraining order was filed by the respondents. Despite a series of oppositions and motions to lift the said order, this Court reiterated its stand and noted that the restraining order is still effective.

There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint”. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.”

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

Petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.

Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.

Records, specifically Meralco’s deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342-343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff.

All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge’s act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

the petition is GRANTED